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The Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements: The United States
Joins the Judgment Enforcement Band
Matthew H. Adler & Michele Crimaldi Zarychta*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the United States signed a treaty that, if ratified, would be the
United States' first-ever international agreement on judgment enforcement.
The treaty provides that (a) where two commercial parties elect to resolve
disputes between them in a particular forum, and (b) a judgment issues from
that forum, then (c) all member states must enforce the judgment.I It is a
document driven by party autonomy; absent a choice of court agreement (in
U.S. parlance, a choice of forum clause), the treaty has no meaning or
applicability.
The treaty's signing was the end of a rigorous journey. The United
2States has been a party to a treaty on arbitration enforcement, and other
nations have been parties to regional agreements on court judgments, but
until now the twain have not met: there has been no agreement involving
both the United States and court judgments.
* Mr. Adler (B.S., Cornell University, 1980, J.D., 1983, Columbia University) is a
partner and Ms. Zarychta (B.S., 2002, Pennsylvania State University, J.D., 2005, Villanova
University School of Law) is an associate at Pepper Hamilton LLP. Mr. Adler is a member
of the Secretary of State's Advisory Group on Private International Law and of the Advisory
Group's working group on judgment enforcement. The opinions expressed herein are
entirely those of the authors.
1 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php
?act=conventions.text&cid=98 [hereinafter Convention]; Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, in ASIL INSIGHTS at 1 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
2005), available at http://asil.org/insights/2005/07/insights050726.html [hereinafter Brand
ASIL] (explaining Convention).
2 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in the United
States on Dec. 29, 1970) (codified in 9 U.S.C. § 201) [hereinafter New York Convention].
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The new treaty, called the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(the "Convention"), is a much scaled-down version of the original U.S.
plan. Hoping to build a skyscraper, the United States has succeeded in
constructing, at most, a low hut. The goal was to create a treaty that would,
with limited exception, allow successful U.S. litigants to collect money by
enforcing U.S. judgments against their opponents' foreign assets. The new
agreement fulfills this goal, allowing businesses that select a particular
forum in their contract and win judgment in that forum to seek to collect on
that judgment in the territory of another signatory to the new agreement.
All others-non-commercial parties, consumers, human rights advocates,
and even those businesses that obtain a court judgment from a forum other
than one selected in their contract-remain excluded by any enforcement
treaty. The Convention is, in some sense, a great leap forward for the
protected few, and in another sense, an admission of failure for a larger
international initiative.
This article addresses those successes and failures. Part II of this
article outlines the history of the U.S. efforts to make it easier for U.S.
litigants to enforce judgments. Part III discusses the drafting and
negotiating history of this particular Convention. Part IV analyzes the
provisions of the concluded Convention. Part V addresses policy
considerations and the question of whether the current text is the first step
on the path to a broader enforcement agreement.
II. JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORICAL PRIMER
Being able to collect in one jurisdiction, on a judgment rendered in
another jurisdiction, is truly a "Revolutionary" concept. Judgment
enforcement lay at the very heart of the Founders' vision of an integrated
market. This notion finds constitutional voice in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.3 That clause,4 however, has a national, continental scope. It does
not apply beyond U.S. borders, and consequently, is irrelevant to a litigant
in the United States trying to enforce a U.S. judgment abroad (nor, for that
3 Internet and Federal Courts: Issues and Obstacles: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 53 (2000)
[hereinafter Kovar Testimony] (statement of Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for
Private International Law, U.S. Dep't of State) ("[T]he framers of the U.S. Constitution
included the Full Faith and Credit Clause to ensure that judgments from one state would be
enforceable in every other."); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 387, 418 (2001) (quoting same). See also
Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign Judgments, 26 NAT'L L.J. 48 (2004) ("Achieving greater
uniformity [in enforcement of judgments in the U.S.] is not merely of theoretical
significance. In a marketplace that seeks to encourage the free flow of investment and trade,
the ability to enforce rights effectively-the free flow of judgments-becomes an important
element of commercial security and success.").
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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matter, does it allow a foreign national to enforce a judgment rendered
abroad against assets in the United States). 5
When trade was largely continental, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
sufficed. The growth of the United States as a major international trading
power, however, exposed the difficulties of enforcing judgments that
resulted when international trade led to disputes between businesses. There
was no treaty that provided for enforcement in one country of any decision
rendered in another, even as so-called Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation ("FCN") treaties otherwise grew.6
This gap was filled in part, for arbitration awards only, in 1970, when
the United States became party to the New York Convention. With a few
limited exceptions, the treaty requires member states to recognize and
enforce arbitration awards rendered in other member states.7 Left in the
cold, however, are parties who do not choose arbitration-either because
they have no formalized contract at all, their contract is silent on dispute
resolution, or their contract affirmatively chooses litigation in a particular
court over arbitration. Beyond these commercial parties who have chosen
to arbitrate their claims are an entire class of tort, consumer, human rights,
and other litigants who also have no prescribed way to enforce U.S.
judgments abroad.
Litigants trying to enforce U.S. judgments abroad have been subject to
an ad hoc enforcement regime that relies wholly on the discretion of the
particular court involved, unfettered by any international obligation, treaty
or otherwise. The result, in some eyes, is a "lose/lose" scenario for U.S.
litigants. Generally, the United States recognizes and enforces foreign
judgments under its principle of comity8 (not reciprocity). 9 On the other
5 id.
6 Friendship, Commerce & Navigation treaties are bilateral treaties dealing with
commercial travelers. For a list of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation treaties entered into
force in the United States, see 22 U.S.C. § 503 (2000).
7 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. 5 (noting exclusions).
8 Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is actually an aspect of choice of
law rules of the forum state. See Harold G. Maier, A Hague Conference Judgments
Convention and United States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1207,
1222 (1998) (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause only applies to states within
the United States). The dominant principle is res judicata. See id. In determining whether a
court will recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, a court will not re-litigate or examine
the merits of the foreign judgment. See id. at 1223. The principle of comity determines
whether a court will recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. See id. ("[A] forum court
ought to enforce foreign decrees or laws when it would want its own similar decrees or laws
enforced in the foreign court if the situation were reversed.").
In Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court listed several factors for determining whether a
court should recognize and enforce a foreign judgment: (1) whether the defendant had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate in the foreign court; (2) whether the trial was conducted
according to regular proceedings; (3) whether the defendant voluntarily appeared before the
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hand, enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad can be refused for any number
of reasons, including but not limited to high damages awards in jury trials.l 0
Some foreign courts also reexamine the merits of U.S. judgments to
determine if they are consistent with the forum's public policy, and if not,
refuse to recognize and enforce them. "
Perhaps still worse, U.S. litigants are subject to exorbitant bases of
jurisdiction abroad when enforcement is sought against their assets in the
United States. These bases include jurisdiction founded solely on the
nationality of the plaintiff'2 or the location of the defendant's property.' 3
Meanwhile, these foreign nations cannot use these same bases to obtain
jurisdiction over an alien defendant (just as they could not have used these
court or "due citation"; (4) whether the foreign judicial system is impartial to foreign
litigants; (5) there is no evidence of prejudice in the court or the judicial system; (6) whether
there was fraud in the procurement of the judgment; (7) and the enforcing court should not
retry the merits of the case. 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1894); see also Maier, note 8, at 1225
("As long as there is no systemic or significant cultural prejudice to the defendant and as
long as the defendant is treated equally with foreign nationals under that forum's local laws,
the United States enforcement forum will usually give effect to the judgment, even if the
precise standards of due process have not been met, unless the foreign decree was 'so
palpably tainted by fraud or prejudice as to outrage our sense of justice."' (quoting
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,444 (3d Cir. 1971))); but
see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
89, 98-99 (1999) ("[B]ecause the U.S. court has no guarantee that a foreign judgment,
although comporting with the basic requirements of the foreign law, is minimally acceptable
to U.S. justice, it will not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment resulting from
proceedings that failed to meet the basic American notions of due process." (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(1)
(1987))).
9 At the time, Hilton also required reciprocity-that the foreign court also would enforce
an American judgment-but that aspect has been abandoned in American jurisprudence. 159
U.S. at 228; see infra note 26 and accompanying text, discussing reciprocity.
10 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 419 (quoting Kovar Testimony, supra note 3); Linda
Silberman, Symposium: Export/Import: American Civil Justice in a Global Context: Eighth
Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy Article: Comparative
Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention
be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 319-20 (2002) ("[M]uch of the attack on American-
style jurisdiction is not really about jurisdiction at all, but about unhappiness with other
aspects of civil litigation in the United States-juries, discovery, class actions, contingent
fees, and often substantive American law, which is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected
under similar pro-plaintiff choice of law rules in U.S. courts.").
1 See Clermont, supra note 8, at 93-94.
12 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 322 n.13 ("'An alien, even if not residing in France,
may be summoned before the French courts for the fulfillment of obligations contracted by
him in France towards a French person; he may be summoned before the courts in France for
obligations contracted by him in a foreign country towards French persons."' (quoting C.
cIv. art. 14 (Fr.))).
13 Id. at 322 n.14 (citing Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] § 23
(F.R.G.)).
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bases against U.S. defendants had the United States been a party to a treaty
such as the Brussels or Lugano Conventions discussed below)."
Thus, by the 1970s, there were two disparities in enforcement: one,
between U.S. and non-U.S. litigants, and the second, between parties to
arbitration and parties to litigation. These disparities led to a concentrated
effort by the U.S. government to close the gap. On a multilateral level, the
United' States was party to a 1971 attempt by The Ha ue Conference on
Private International Law (the "Hague Conference") ' to establish an
enforcement convention. '6  The resulting international recognition and
enforcement agreement, however, ultimately was only ratified by three
countries and never entered into force.' 7 Bilaterally, the United States also
tried to close the gap by negotiating an agreement with Great Britain in
1976. 18 The attempt failed, due in large part to concerns from the London
insurance market about U.S. damages awards. 19
Away from the United States, however, regional enforcement
14 See Clermont, supra note 8, at 93 ("The Brussels Convention openly discriminates
against outsiders, as it applies only to defendants domiciled in a signatory state.").
15 The Hague Conference was established in 1893 and the United States became a
member in 1964. See Russell J. Weintraub, Symposium: "Could a Treaty Trump Supreme
Court Jurisdictional Doctrine?": Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the
Judgments Convention, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1269, 1269 n.1 (1998) (discussing history of the
Hague Conference).
16 The Hague Conference is an organization of member States that has been successful in
creating other multilateral treaties such as Taking of Evidence Abroad, Abolishing the
Requirement of Legalization, and International Child Abduction. See Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=-conventions.text&cid= 17; Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847
U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act-conventions.text&cid=82;
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents, with
annex, Oct. 5, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 883, 527 U.N.T.S. 189, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=41; Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S.
49, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24.
17 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters and Supplementary Protocol, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249,
available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=78 and
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=79; Russell J. Weintraub,
Symposium Article: How Substantial is our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention
and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 169 (1998)
(explaining prior treaty).
18 See Draft Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters, U.S.-U.K., initialed Oct. 26, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 71; Maier, supra note 8, at 1207
n.2 (citing failed treaty).
19 The treaty failed when the British insurance industry, fearing large jury awards,
protested. Weintraub, supra note 17, at 169 (citing failed treaty).
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mechanisms proliferated. The European Community nations entered into
the Brussels Convention in 1968.2p In 1988, the Lugano Convention
extended the Brussels Convention to non-European Union countries. 21 The
Brussels Convention was superseded by the Brussels Regulation in 2000.22
Both the Lugano Convention and Brussels Regulation provide for judgment
enforcement across prescribed borders and sharply circumvent review of
the underlying merits of the case.
Because of the disparity between U.S. and non-U.S. litigants, United
States efforts picked up again in the early 1990s. In 1992, the United States
proposed that the Hague Conference again consider an enforcement
convention. The process at The Hague took thirteen years. While the
United States hoped that the Hague Conference would yield a
comprehensive multilateral treaty on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments resembling the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention, the
resulting treaty was limited to enforcement of judgments solely in the
context of a choice of court/choice of forum clause in the parties' contract,
as explained more fully below. The Member States of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law signed the Final Act of the
Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
on June 30, 2005 at the Peace Palace at The Hague, which produced the
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.23
III. NEGOTIATION OF THE CONVENTION
While the Convention is a leap forward from zero, it falls well short of
the original U.S. aim. This happened for two primary and quite linked
reasons. First, foreign countries were concerned with U.S. notions of
20 See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1413, available at http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/convention-bruxelles/en/c-textes/brux-
idx.htm [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
21 See Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620,
available at http://www.curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/lug.htm.
Regional treaties like the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention and the Inter-
American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial
Validity of Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, OAS Treaty Ser. No. A/39, reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 468, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-50.htm, which the
United States has not signed, have been successful. See Weintraub, supra note 17, at 169.
22 The Brussels Convention has been superseded by Council Regulation (EC) No.
44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, available at
http://www.curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/02001 R0044.pdf
[hereinafter Brussels Regulation].
23 See generally, Convention, supra note 1. See also Brand ASIL, supra note 1, at 1.
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expansive jurisdiction and damages.2 4  Second, the United States lacked
bargaining power. In the view of the U.S. State Department, "[s]ince
litigants from most developed countries have no substantial difficulties
enforcing judgments in the United States, their governments believe they
have substantial negotiating leverage over us.''25 The perception of leverage
colored the negotiations, which might have come out differently had the
United States insisted or been able to insist on reciprocity.2 6
24 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 419 (quoting Kovar Testimony, supra note 3); Silberman,
supra note 10, at 319-20 ("[M]uch of the attack on American-style jurisdiction is not really
about jurisdiction at all, but about unhappiness with other aspects of civil litigation in the
United States-juries, discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and often substantive
American law, which is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected under similar pro-plaintiff
choice of law rules in US courts.").
25 Id. at 420 (quoting Kovar Testimony, supra note 3). See supra note 8 (discussing
America's view of comity and liberal enforcement policy of foreign judgments).
Unfortunately, participating countries are paying less attention to the global
advantage of an international treaty governing recognition and enforcement than to
their own specific national goals, which are not aligned and inevitably run counter
to one another. For example, the United States is largely interested in increasing
recognition of its judgments abroad, while other countries' interests are focused
exclusively on limiting the exposure of their nationals to exorbitant foreign
jurisdiction and what is deemed to be excessive compensation and damages
awarded by U.S. courts. These clashes in national goals, together with difficult
power dynamics, potential conflicts with U.S. [C]onstitutional law, and past failure
of the United States to achieve even bilateral consensus on key recognition issues,
have led many scholars and practitioners to doubt that the Hague Convention in its
current form will ever be finalized.
Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing Reciprocity
Requirement into US International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L.
239, 259 (2004).
26 Murphy, supra note 3, at 420 (quoting Kovar Testimony, supra note 3); see also
Silberman, supra note 10, at 321-22 (explaining that because the European Union and EFTA
states already receive the benefit of judgment recognition in the United States, they used
recognition and enforcement of American judgments abroad as a bargaining tool to limit the
U.S. ability to exercise what they saw as "exorbitant" bases ofjurisdiction).
Some U.S. states, however, make reciprocity mandatory or at least discretionary in
deciding whether they will enforce a foreign judgment. See Linda J. Silberman and Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALl. Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an
International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L. J. 635, 636 (2000) [hereinafter
Silberman and Lowenfeld]. Examples of discretionary use of reciprocity are FLA. STAT.
§ 55.605(2)(g) (2005), IDAHO CODE ANN. § 10-1404(2)(g) (2005), OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.92(B) (West 2005), TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (Vernon
2005). See Silberman and Lowenfeld, supra, at 636 n.9 (citing states with discretionary
reciprocity provisions). Massachusetts and Georgia, however, have mandatory reciprocity
provisions. See id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A (West 2005) and GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-12-132 (West 2005)).
In May 2005, the American Law Institute ("ALl") approved the final draft of the
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The path to the Convention has been a rocky one. In May of 1992, the
United States proposed that the Hague Conference create a multilateral
treaty on the international recognition and enforcement of judgments.27
Negotiation sessions at the Hague resulted in the Preliminary Draft (the
"1999 Draft") in October 1999, which was based on provisions that
received a majority vote. 8
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute.
PROPOSED FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (REVISED) XXII
(Proposed Final Draft, Am. Law. Inst. 2005) [hereinafter ALl Proposed Statute]. The
proposed federal statute started as implementing legislation for the Convention but when the
Convention refocused on a more limited scope, the ALI continued with its project. See
Foreign Judgments 8/23/04, supra note 3, at 1. If adopted, the ALl federal statute would
preempt the uniform act recently finalized by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). Id. at 2.
This proposed federal statute is more like the original Hague drafts in that it is very
comprehensive. "As approved, the project incorporates a creative approach to encouraging
other nations to enter into reciprocal agreements with the United States to enforce foreign
judgments, including many not within the scope of the new Hague Convention." Peter D.
Trooboff, Foreign Judgments, 28 NAT'L L. J. 7, 2 (Oct. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Foreign
Judgments 10/17/05] (noting value of the form). The proposal also includes a compendium
of research by Andreas Lowenfeld and Linda Silberman, New York University School of
Law Professors, and explains issues such as how to handle the public policy exception in
connection with the First Amendment. Id. (citing Reporters' Note 6(d), § 5). For a complete
discussion on the history of the ALl proposed federal statute, see generally Miller, supra
note 25.
In July 2005, the NCCUSL approved the Uniform Foreign-Country Judgments
Recognition Act (2005), at the 114th meeting, which amends the 1962 Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act enacted in thirty states. Foreign Judgments 10/17/05,
supra note 26, at 3. See UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
(NCCUSL 2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ufmjra/2005final.htm
[hereinafter NCCUSL Act].
While the ALl Proposed Statute includes a reciprocity requirement, the NCCUSL Act
does not, stating, "while recognition of U.S. judgments continues to be problematic in a
number of foreign countries, there was insufficient evidence to establish that a reciprocity
requirement would have a greater effect on encouraging foreign recognition of U.S.
judgments than does the approach taken by the Act." Foreign Judgments 10/17/05, supra
note 26, at 3 (quoting NCCUSL Act, supra, Prefatory Note).
27 See Ronald A. Brand, Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation at
the Hague Conference on Private International Law: A View from the United States, 21 J. L.
& COM. 191, 192 (2002) [hereinafter Brand I] (citing Letter from Edwin D. Williamson,
Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague
Conference on Private International Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed with Hague Conference
doc. L.C. ON No. 15 (1992)) (explaining history of convention)). The United States was
persuaded to propose such a convention by Harvard Law Professor Arthur T. von Mehren.
Foreign Judgments 10/17/05, supra note 26, at 1.
28 See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Prelim. Doc. No. 11 Oct. 19, 1999, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3494&dtid=35 [hereinafter
1999 Draft]; Brand I, supra note 27, at 193 (explaining history of the 1999 Draft).
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The United States, however, found the 1999 Draft unacceptable.
Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law at the U.S. State
Department, Jeffrey Kovar, wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the
Hague Conference noting four major problems with the 1999 Draft. First,
the draft looked more like the Brussels and Lugano Conventions than the
United States desired because of the majoritarian voting process used to
approve its provisions.29  Second, the Brussels Convention was
unacceptable to the United States because it failed to consider the due
process limitations in the U.S. Constitution. Third, forcing all jurisdictional
bases into either the white list or black list 30 created "unnecessary
'canonization' and 'demonization' of jurisdictional bases. 31  Fourth, the
draft included provisions covering areas of law that were not yet firmly
established in states' own legal systems, such as intellectual property, e-
commerce, and other new technology utilized in commercial transactions.
32
To facilitate a more globally acceptable draft, the United States
proposed a consensus rather than a majoritarian approach.33 The delegates
forged another draft called the Interim Text ("2001 Draft") at a diplomatic
conference in June 2001. Although a consensus approach was approved,
29 See Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Alasdair Wallace, Head of International and Common Law Services Division, U.K. Lord
Chancellor's Dep't, at 1 (Sept. 10, 2000) available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/
jurisdiction/kovarletter.html [hereinafter Kovar Letter of 9/10/00] ("[W]e note that the
October 1999 text follows too closely the structure and content of the Brussels Convention.
Neighboring countries with common legal, cultural, and political traditions to be an essential
part of their common effort to build a greater economic and political union developed the
Brussels Convention. The regional success of this convention does not necessarily project it
as a global solution because its context and objectives are very different from those of a
worldwide convention.").
30 For a discussion on the white list and black list, see infra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
31 Brand I, supra note 27, at 198. See also Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conference on
Private International Law, at 5 (Sept. 10, 2000) available at
http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/intpil/doc00003.doc [hereinafter Kovar Letter of
2/22/00] ("[T]he current draft creates rigid principles and factors for prohibiting jurisdiction
that will lead to excessive litigation and to conflict among parties over the resulting lack of
uniformity of application. The result is likely to be substantially diminished support for the
convention.").
32 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 197-198; Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31, at 4, 6
(addressing e-commerce and intellectual property concerns); see also infra notes 124-145
(discussing Internet and e-commerce issues).
33 Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a
Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable
World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 191, 193
(2001) (discussing Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31).
34 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission II, Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Summary of the Outcome of the
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the delegates adhered to the majoritarian voting method, resulting in a
myriad of alternative provisions appearing in brackets, yielding no
consensus text with which to work.35
In January 2003, at the suggestion of the Chair, and because the
convention was not making headway, the Hague Conference decided to
refocus the discussions. The new goal was to negotiate a more limited
convention on choice of court clauses in business-to-business contracts.36
The end result of these discussions was the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements concluded on June 30, 2005.
The Convention's negotiation revealed sharp debates among countries
on a number of issues. This article focuses on the three primary ones:
jurisdiction, damages, and particular causes of action covered.
A. Jurisdiction
1. Compromising on a Mixed Convention
Because enforcement means that one state will treat another state's
judgment as its own, the enforcing state must treat another's jurisdiction as
its own. Absent jurisdiction, there is no case and thus no judgment to
enforce. Central to the debate about enforcement, then, is the question of
the jurisdictional inquiry that must take place before a case proceeds, and
central to this question is in which forum that inquiry occurs.
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001,
Interim Text, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid =
3499&dtid=35 [hereinafter 2001 Draft]; see Brand I, supra note 27, at 193 (discussing 2001
Draft, supra).
" Id. at 198.
36 See id. at 195 (citing Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission Ion
General Affairs and Policy: Summary report prepared by the Permanent Bureau (Apr. 22-
24, 2002)) (discussing a shift in focus); see id. at 198 (citing Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Commission II: Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Working Doc. No. 97 (June 18, 2001)); Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Some Reflections on the Present State of Negotiations on the Judgments Project in the
Context of the Future Work Programme of the Conference, at 4 n.2, Prelim. Doc. 16 (Feb.
2002) (noting that Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Norway proposed that the
convention focus on areas of consensus); Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Report on the Work of
the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, in Particular on the Preliminary
Text Achieved at its Third Meeting-25-28 March 2003, at 4-5, Prelim. Doc. 22 (June 2003)
(proposing that a draft of a Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Clauses be made at the
January 6-9, 2003 meeting); Hague Conference on Private International Law, Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Prelim. Doc. 25 (Mar. 2004) (containing first draft of
the new convention).
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The European states wanted a so-called "double convention" modeled
after the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention.37 The United States,
however, proposed a so-called "mixed convention" from the outset because
it would provide the United States with more flexibility.38  The Special
Commission did not vote to adopt a mixed convention until June 14, 1999.
39
This debate was reflected in the language of the 2001 Draft, essentially a
double convention model.4n
A "single convention" applies exclusively to the enforcing court.4 '
The enforcing court will inquire whether the rendering court had•42
jurisdiction to render the judgment. A "double convention," on the other
hand, applies to both the rendering court and the enforcing court. The
rendering court only has jurisdiction if it can satisfy one of the permitted
jurisdictional bases enumerated in the convention (the "white list").4 3 There
is also a list of prohibited bases of jurisdiction that participating states may
37 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 199. See also Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, Report
of the Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Enforcement of
Judgments, Prelim. Doc. 11 (Aug. 11, 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop
/jdgmpdl 1 .pdf.
38 See Kovar Letter of 9/10/00, supra note 29, at 2 ("Unlike the Brussels Convention, a
global convention must necessarily leave substantial room for national practices to continue
outside the limited core jurisdictional provisions of the convention."); Kovar Letter of
2/22/00, supra note 31, at 5 ("We believe that unless there is a clear, well-defined permitted
area ofjurisdiction that allows for growth and development in the future, the convention will
not have the flexibility it needs to meet the requirements of a changing world.").
39 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 199 ("' [S]everal experts noted that the very fact of
providing for jurisdiction based on national law indicated that the present negotiations were
moving towards the conclusion of a mixed rather than a double convention. Several experts
affirmed that they still aspired to a double convention; others noted, however, that it was
merely being realistic to recognize that in a global context only a mixed convention could be
achieved."' (quoting Article 17 of the Sixty-fifth Plenary Meeting of the Special
Commission, Report of Meeting No. 65, at 1)). See also Brand I, supra note 27, at 196-97.
40 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 197. See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 200 ("The
Special Commission in its work premised a higher degree of consensus among the Hague
Conference Members than existed and ignored the full implication of the fundamental
differences in the economic, political, and institutional situation that made the Brussels and
Lugano conventions workable, and the global setting of a Hague Convention.").
41 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 195 (discussing single conventions).
42 See id.; Ronald A. Brand, Symposium Article: Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral
Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125, 143 (1998) [hereinafter Brand II] ("The enforcing court does not
question whether the court of origination properly exercised its own jurisdiction. Rather, the
jurisdictional analysis conducted by the enforcing court deals only with whether the court of
origination exercised jurisdiction in a manner recognized as appropriate either by the
recognizing state or in the applicable convention.").
43 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 197 (explaining double conventions).
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not use (the "black list").44  The enforcing court then must enforce the
judgment unless one of the bases for refusal of recognition and enforcement
apply, eliminating the need to inquire whether the rendering court had
jurisdiction.45 Accordingly, the court must look to both the white list to
ensure the basis is allowed and then to the black list to make sure the basis
is not prohibited. The double convention works well if the states involved
have similar legal traditions and if there is a neutral oversight institution
established to oversee the uniform interpretation of the convention, like the
European Court of Justice in the Brussels Regulation.46
A "mixed convention" combines the two types of conventions. It
contains both a white and a black list, like a double convention, but also has
a "gray" list, which includes any basis for jurisdiction that a state's law
would allow that is not on either the white list or the black list.47  If a
rendering court assumes jurisdiction based on the gray list, an enforcing
court does not have to recognize the rendering court's authority and may
review the rendering court's authority under the enforcing court's own
44 Prohibited bases of jurisdiction are akin to violations of the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. See Silberman, supra note 10, at 337. See also id. at 338 (noting that the
prohibited bases listed in Article 18(2) of the 2001 Draft are also likely unconstitutional in
the United States).
45 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 197-98. The U.S. federal system is similar to a
double convention because it provides prohibited bases of jurisdiction and the constitutional
minimum test enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington provides permissible
bases for exercising personal jurisdiction. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See von Mehren, supra
note 33, at 197, n.15 ("There is ... a marked tendency for each state to claim adjudicatory
authority to the extent constitutionally permitted. Accordingly, in American practice,
constitutionally permitted bases can be seen as equivalent to bases in the sense that,
generally speaking, nearly all states take jurisdiction where the Constitution of the United
States permits. States are required to recognize and enforce judgments rendered on such
constitutionally permitted jurisdictional bases under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution.").
46 Because the law in the Contracting States has evolved over the years, to understand
and regulate fairly, the law now requires specialists in areas of law. See Arthur T. von
Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign
Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 191, 200 (2001). Drafting provisions that all the states would understand would be
hard to do, especially without an adjudicatory or institutional entity to oversee the uniform
interpretation of the Convention. See id. In fact, the Special Commission considered
whether it should have an institutional body to govern the Convention; however, nothing
materialized from these discussions. Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the
Special Commission of March 1998 on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 45 no. 118, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Enforcement of Judgments, Prelim. Doc. No. 9 (July 1998), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pd9.pdf [hereinafter Kessedjian Report]. See von
Mehren, supra note 33, at 200 n.23 (citing the Kessedjian Report, supra, and noting that it
might be possible to have meetings from time to time and exchange information on the
uniform interpretation of the Convention).
47 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 196 (explaining mixed conventions).
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rules.48  This review of the rendering court's authority may lead the
enforcing court to refuse recognition and enforcement of the judgment.
For example, assume Company XYZ manufactures bicycles. John
Smith buys a bicycle in State A. The brakes on the bicycle do not work and
Smith falls down a hill, injuring himself. Smith sues XYZ in State A. State
A may assume jurisdiction, pursuant to the white list, if XYZ is
incorporated under State A's laws. Smith may then go to State B, where
XYZ's assets are located, and have the courts of State B enforce the
judgment rendered in State A against XYZ's assets. If XYZ is instead
incorporated under State B's laws, and has no other connection with State
A, but comes to State A for a meeting, and Smith serves the president of
XYZ with process while he is visiting State A, State A may not assume
jurisdiction over XYZ based on transient jurisdiction, as this basis is on the
black list. Under the gray list's jurisdictional basis of general doing
business unrelated to the action, if XYZ, who resides in State B, advertises
and solicits business from 300 individuals in State A and attends meetings
in State A, State A may obtain general jurisdiction over XYZ. As this area
is on the gray list, however, if State A renders a judgment and Smith tries to
enforce it in State B, where XYZ's assets are located, State B may question
State A's authority to render the judgment, may inquire into the merits of
the case, and may refuse to recognize and enforce the judgment.
Adopting a mixed convention provides several advantages in pursuing
a larger agreement on judgment enforcement, such as allowing the
convention delegates to openly debate issues of jurisdiction, while still
making progress by simply putting areas in which the delegates do not
agree onto the gray list and moving the discussions along to bases on which
the delegates do agree.49 Some argue that had the Special Commission
adopted such a process from the beginning, the convention would have
48 See id. at 196. In the United States, this would mean that the court would apply the
Hilton doctrine of comity. See supra note 8 (discussing the American doctrine of comity).
49 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 196 (discussing benefits of a mixed convention). See
also Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31, at 5 ("[T]here should be carefully defined bases
of required jurisdiction reflecting all delegations' legal traditions, a limited list of well-
known exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction, and a substantial permitted area that will provide
the flexibility for the convention to adapt to changing circumstances.").
Some argue, however, that leaving areas in the gray zone makes the treaty useless because
foreign courts still will not recognize and enforce United States judgments. See Patrick J.
Borchers, Symposium: "Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doctrine? ":
Judgments, Conventions, and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (1998)
("Leaving important subjects such as tort jurisdiction in an unregulated gray zone could
deprive any convention of a good deal of its usefulness, and might make other nations-
already wary of United States institutions such as jury trials and punitive damages-
reluctant to sign."). In fact, "[it may well be that United States insistence on negotiating
around its domestic jurisdictional law makes it impossible to reach agreement." Id. at 1164.
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been broader and the negotiations more expeditious. 50 A mixed convention
may also have the potential long-term benefit of clarifying currently
unsettled rules as to jurisdiction, for example, those on e-commerce. 51
Another benefit to the mixed convention is that it provides information
to plaintiffs about which bases of jurisdiction an enforcing court would
most likely enforce a judgment, thereby encouraging plaintiffs and their
attorneys to use only the permitted bases and stay away from bases on the
gray list.52  In this way, maintaining a gray list would harmonize
international bases of jurisdiction as plaintiffs abandoned exorbitant bases
of jurisdiction in favor of jurisdictional bases on the white list.
53
While purporting to expressly adopt a mixed convention, the 1999 and
2001 Drafts appeared to follow more of a double convention model because
of the majoritarian voting process used to approve the drafts, and because
fifteen of the convention member states were Member States of the
European Union that wanted the new convention to be similar to the
Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention.54 The problem with a double
convention, however, is that it cannot be applied as easily in a global
context. 55 Most European Union states are civil law jurisdictions that have
different legal cultures than common law jurisdictions.56 The United States,
50 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 198-99 (discussing benefits of a mixed convention).
51 See Brand 1, supra note 27, at 196 ("This is particularly important in regard to
jurisdiction for matters involving intellectual property rights and electronic commerce; issues
for which no legal system has yet developed a satisfactory, fixed set of rules, and for which
it would be presumptuous to believe a global solution could be found and then imposed by
treaty within the near future."). See infra notes 124-145 (discussing intellectual property
and e-commerce).
52 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 201 (quoting Arthur von Mehren, Enforcing
Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 17, 28 (1998)) (discussing possible benefits to mixed conventions).
53 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 349 ("If foreign enforcement appeared to be
necessary, lawyers would gravitate toward using one of the Convention's accepted bases of
jurisdiction. Lawyers could still bring suit using other bases of jurisdiction (as long as they
were outside the prohibited list), but if they did so they would take their chances on having
that judgment enforced elsewhere. The Convention could go even further by authorizing
States to declare certain bases of gray area jurisdiction that would support judgments that
their courts would regard as entitled to recognition. Such a provision would offer flexibility
for maximizing recognition and enforcement between particular countries that share similar
legal cultures and traditions with respect to jurisdictional regimes, and such declaration
would create greater certainty with respect to enforcement and recognition.").
54 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 196-97 (explaining format of 1999 and 2001 Drafts).
55 See id. at 197 (noting problems with double conventions).
56 Civil law, which is based on Roman law, generally required the plaintiff to bring
claims against the defendant in the defendant's domicile. See Clermont, supra note 8, at 91
(explaining civil law). It was not until later that civil law expanded its long arm jurisdiction
in cases such as torts and contracts to allow the plaintiff to bring a cause of action where the
wrongful conduct occurred. See id. at 91.
Choice of Court Agreements
27:1 (2006)
specifically, had problems with the 2001 Draft because of the constitutional
limitations of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as discussed in more detail below.
57
Although the convention was unable to reach a consensus on the
majority of the text, several areas of the 2001 Draft had reached consensus,
such as common bases for exercising jurisdiction.58 Theses common bases
included: (1) the court where the parties agreed to litigate, (2) the
defendant's habitual residence,59 (3) in the context of physical torts, the
place where the act that caused the injury occurred and where the injury
manifests itself, as long as that jurisdiction is reasonable and the defendant
engaged in conduct there, (4) where the defendant has a branch, agency, or
57 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 197 (discussing problems with the 1999 and 2001 Draft).
See also Maier, supra note 8, at 1209-10 ("Both the rationales and holdings in United States
Supreme Court cases and the lack of any sufficiently compelling practical reason to change
that constitutional analysis in favor of new conventional requirements supports the
conclusion that these long-standing constitutional limitations would remain controlling. A
[double] convention... would, therefore, be unenforceable in the United States unless its
jurisdictional requirements came within the ambit of United States constitutional
limitations.").
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly require certain criteria for a court to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant. See also id. The Due Process Clause, however, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, requires certain principles of fairness to be met before a defendant
can be haled into court. See also Maier, supra note 8, at 1211. See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S.
at 316 (1945) (requiring that the defendant have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum such that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant "does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice"). Moreover, because the U.S. Constitution is the
supreme law of the land, a treaty cannot trump constitutional requirements. See id. at 1211-
12 (noting that treaties are held under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
subject to its limitations); see infra notes 57, 80-84 (discussing constitutionality of the
treaty).
In interpreting a double convention, the U.S. Supreme Court would not allow the treaty to
trump constitutional due process requirements. See Maier, supra note 8, at 1215. It is also
unlikely that two-thirds of the Senate would vote to ratify a treaty that violated due process
requirements. See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate and two-thirds of the Senate's approval to ratify a treaty).
Consequently, the United States had to object to the drafts which required it to violate due
process requirements. See Maier, supra note 8, at 1215-16 (explaining that the U.S.
Department of State would be unlikely to negotiate or sign an international agreement which
would supersede individual protections of the U.S. Constitution).
Some have argued that one way to mitigate concerns over constitutionality of a double
convention would be for Congress to enact implementing legislation giving federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and requiring a
nationwide contacts test for personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1216, 1218-19 (explaining that
this approach makes sense because "[s]uch an agreement ... invoke[s] the status of the
United States as a sovereign state in the international sense."). See also ALI Proposed
Statute, supra note 26.
58 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 199 (noting areas of consensus).
59 This is similar to the U.S. concept of citizenship and domicile.
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establishment as long as that branch, agency, or establishment was involved
in the activities from which the claim arose, and (5) counterclaims in the
original action as long as there is an independent permitted basis for the
counterclaim as well.
6 °
2. Court/Defendant v. Court/Claim Nexus
In addition to the double convention/mixed convention debate, the
Hague Conference addressed the debate over establishing jurisdiction on
the connection between the court and the defendant, or the court and the
claim. The U.S. approach and the approach taken in Article 2 of the
Brussels Regulation base jurisdiction on a connection between the court and
the defendant, known as "general jurisdiction" in the Brussels Regulation.
61
A second type of jurisdiction available under the Brussels Regulation is
called "special jurisdiction," based on a connection between the court and
the claim.
62
The Brussels Regulation, the 1999 Draft, and the 2001 Draft combine
both types of jurisdictional rules. 63  The core framework of both the
Brussels Regulation and the Hague Drafts is that of general jurisdiction.
64
The special jurisdictional rules are exceptions to the general jurisdictional
framework.6  European courts construing the Brussels Regulation and the
predecessor Brussels Convention have held that the general jurisdiction
nexus between court and defendant takes precedence over special
60 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 199. These bases, however, would also require the
delegates to consider other topics such as forum non conveniens, lis pendens, and damage
awards where there is not currently a consensus. See id. at 199 (noting areas of
disagreement).
61 See Brussels Regulation, supra note 22, ch. 2, art. 2 (basing jurisdiction on the
domiciliary of the defendant); U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (noting that Due Process Clause
limits where the defendant can be haled into court); Brand I, supra note 27, at 200
(explaining personal jurisdiction in Brussels Regulation and Hague Drafts).
62 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 200; Brussels Regulation, supra note 22, ch. 2, arts. 5-
16 (most provisions in the convention are based on special jurisdiction).
63 See id. General jurisdictional rules can be seen in Article 3 of the Hague drafts basing
jurisdiction on the habitual residence of the defendant, Article 9 basing jurisdiction on the
branch, agency, or establishment of the defendant and Article 4 basing jurisdiction on where
the defendant has voluntarily agreed to appear in a choice of court clause. See id. at 200.
Special jurisdictional rules appear in Article 6 on contracts, Article 7 on consumer contracts,
Article 8 on employment contracts, Article 10 on torts, Article 11 on trusts, and Article 12
on exclusive jurisdiction. See id.
64 See 1999 Draft, supra note 28, art. 3; see also 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 3; see
also Brussels Regulation, supra note 22, ch. 2, art. 2 ("persons domiciled in a Member State
shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State"); Brand I, supra
note 27, at 200-01 (explaining basic jurisdictional concepts of Brussels Regulation and
Hague Drafts).
65 Brand I, supra note 27 at 201.
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jurisdiction nexus between the court and claim.66 Yet the Hague Drafts
provided for a court/claim nexus without any connection to the defendant.
This is mostly because civil law Member States base their jurisdictional
rules on a court/claim nexus.67 The special jurisdictional rules in the Hague
Drafts, however, would have violated the Due Process Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution 68 because, while civil law countries focus bases of jurisdiction
on the nexus between the court and the claim, the U.S. Due Process Clause
requires that there also be a connection between the court and the
defendant. 69 For example, allowing tort jurisdiction based on where the
injury occurred may violate the Due Process Clause if the defendant has not
had sufficient minimum contacts with the state.7°
An example of the historical progression of the court/claim and
court/defendant nexus dilemma can be seen in Article 5 of the Brussels
Regulation and Articles 6 and 10 of the 1999 Draft. 7' Article 5 of the
Brussels Regulation allows a rendering court to exercise jurisdiction "in the
courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question" for
66 Id. at 202.
67 Id. (expressing surprise at permitting a court/claim nexus unrelated to a
court/defendant nexus).
68 id.
69 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 330 (explaining differences between civil law and
common law jurisdictions).
70 Id. Compare Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (1945) (establishing minimum contacts
test to satisfy due process requirements) and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S.
102, 116 (1987) (denying jurisdiction over foreign defendant because of due process
requirements) with Case 21/76, Handelswekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace
S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1745-48 (1976) (discussing tort jurisdiction). See supra note 57;
see infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of the treaty).
For a comparison of Bier and Asahi, see Weintraub, supra note 15, at 1271-73. In Bier,
the European Court of Justice liberally construed the tort jurisdiction provision in Article
5(3) of the Brussels Convention holding that "the plaintiff has an option to commence
proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event giving
rise to it." Id. (quoting Bier, 1976 E.C.R. at 1747). In Asahi, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that, although the defendant may have foreseen that its product would end up in California,
Asahi did not "purposefully avail itself of the California market." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
Because European states did not like the broad interpretation of Article 5(3) in Bier, some
argue that the European states would not oppose a "purposeful availment" requirement, like
that articulated in Asahi, in the Convention. See Weintraub, supra note 15, at 1272
(commenting that one of Europe's leaders in international law, Professor Schlosser of the
University of Munich, has stated that European nations would not object to the purposeful
availment requirement). While the Due Process clause requires a close connection between
the defendant and the court, Bier required a close connection between the claim and the
court. See Brand II, supra note 42, at 144 (citing Bier, 1976 E.C.R. at 1746). The court held
that the connecting factor is where the damage occurred and "where the event giving rise to
the damage occurred." See id. (citing Bier, 1976 E.C.R. at 1746). See id. at 145-51
(discussing the cases from the European Court of Justice interpreting Article 5(3) after Bier).
71 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 203 (comparing Brussels Regulation and 1999 Draft).
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contracts, such as where the goods were delivered, and "in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred" for torts.72 Similarly, Article 6 of
the 1999 Draft permitted contract case jurisdiction where "performance of
the principal obligation took place" or where the goods or services were
supplied. 7  Article 10 of the 1999 Draft permitted tort case jurisdiction
where the act or commission occurred or where the injury occurred as long
as it was foreseeable.74 While these provisions are similar to many U.S.
long arm statutes, which permit jurisdiction where the injury occurred or
the place of contract performance,75 the United States also requires the
defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not offend the traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.76  Consequently, the overriding test in the United
States is whether there is a court/defendant nexus rather than a court/claim
nexus.
7 7
The 2001 Draft tried to reconcile the court/claim nexus with the
court/defendant nexus approach by putting the U.S. approach to contractS 78
jurisdiction as Alternative A. Although the bracketed language in the
2001 Draft shows that the delegates were uncertain about the preferred
jurisdictional basis, it does show a concerted effort to combine both the
72 Brussels Regulation, supra note 22, arts. 5 (1), 5(3). See Brand I, supra note 27, at 203
(discussing contract and tort jurisdiction).
73 1999 Draft, supra note 28, art. 6. See Brand I, supra note 27, at 204 (discussing
contract jurisdiction in 1999 Draft).
74 1999 Draft, supra note 28, art. 10. See Brand I, supra note 27, at 204 (discussing tort
jurisdiction in 1999 Draft). According to Jeffrey Kovar, Article 6 of the 1999 Draft was too
narrow because it lacked a provision for non-performance of contracts, which could be
satisfied by including a provision for "substantial commercial activity" of the defendant.
Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31, at 6.
75 See Brand I, supra note 27, at 204-05 (comparing 1999 Draft to U.S. long arm
statutes).
76 See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (defining due process test); Brand I, supra note 27,
at 204-05. See also Murphy, supra note 3, at 420 ("[T]he United States is unable to accept
certain grounds ofjurisdiction as they are applied in Europe under the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions .... [W]e cannot, consistent with the Constitution, accept tort jurisdiction based
solely on the place of the injury, or contract jurisdiction based solely on [the] place of
performance stated in the contract." (quoting Kovar Testimony, supra note 3, at 26)).
77 Brand I, supra note 27, at 205.
78 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 6, Alternative A; see Silberman, supra note 10, at 333
& n.80. Alternative B to Article 6 of the 2001 Draft allows contract jurisdiction where the
goods or services are to be supplied in whole or in part, or if the contract involved both
goods and services, where "performance of the principal obligation took place." 2001 Draft,
supra note 34, art. 6, Alternative B(a)-(c). "From the American viewpoint, this formulation
for a jurisdictional provision for contract cases is narrow and formalistic" because many
contracts do not fit exactly into one category or other and discerning whether the contract is
for goods or services or both is an unnecessary step in the process. Silberman, supra note
10, at 333 (citing Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31).
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civil law court/claim nexus and the common law court/defendant nexus.79
Ultimately, there are no specific provisions for tort and contract dispute
jurisdiction in the final Convention because, by determination, when the
parties affirmatively choose a forum in a contractual selection clause, they
agree on jurisdiction. The contractual forum selection clause requirement
leaves tort victims without a robust international judgment enforcement
mechanism, as they do not enter into contractual choice of court clauses
before becoming victims.
3. Multiple Defendants and Third Party Defendants
The 1999 Draft presented additional jurisdictional court/claim nexus
areas with constitutional due process problems for the United States.80 In
Article 14 of the 1999 Draft, the white list authorized jurisdiction over
multiple defendants when one of the defendants habitually resided in the
forum.8  Article 16 permitted jurisdiction over third-party defendants for
claims for indemnity and contribution if the rendering court had jurisdiction
over the original claim.82 The United States objected to both of these bases
of jurisdiction as violative of the Due Process Clause because a
court/defendant nexus was not required for each defendant before the
rendering court.83 As a result of U.S. objections, both bases of jurisdiction
were moved to the gray list in the 2001 Draft.84
4. Exorbitant Bases of Jurisdiction
Examination of the prohibited list reveals other areas of compromise in
jurisdiction. "Reciprocal compromises" are evident in Article 18 of the
1999 Draft, where four countries gave up different bases of exorbitant
jurisdiction that are currently recognized in their states. 85 For example, the
79 Brand I, supra note 27, at 207.
80 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 196 (explaining due process concerns). Derivative
jurisdiction is when a court bases jurisdiction over codefendants where one of the defendants
is domiciled or allows jurisdiction over third-party defendants. See Clermont, supra note 8,
at 96 (explaining that derivative jurisdiction is derived from French law and citing Nouveau
code de procedure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 42, para. 2 (Fr.) (codefendants) and art. 333 (third
parties)).
81 1999 Draft, supra note 28, art. 14. This is sometimes referred to as derivative
jurisdiction. Specifically, derivative jurisdiction is when a court bases jurisdiction over
codefendants where one of the defendants is domiciled or allows jurisdiction over third-party
defendants. See Clermont, supra note 8, at 96 (explaining that derivative jurisdiction is
derived from French law and citing Nouveau code de procedure civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 42,
para 2. (Fr.) (codefendants) and art. 333 (third parties)).
82 1999 Draft, supra note 28, art. 16.
83 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 330-31 (discussing problems with 1999 Draft).
84 See id. at 331.
85 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 195-96 (citing exorbitant bases of unlimited general
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United States and the United Kingdom relinquished transient jurisdiction,
Germany abandoned jurisdiction based solely on the fact that the defendant
had property present in the forum,8 6 and France abandoned jurisdiction
based solely on the nationality of the plaintiff.
87
The United States, while succeeding in not having general jurisdiction
based on "doing business" on the prohibited list, failed to get the basis on
the permitted list.88 The 2001 Draft left this basis in brackets, implying that
the United States might be able to argue around it. This language, however,
is ultimately unnecessary because the final draft requires a defendant to
voluntarily accept jurisdiction of the rendering court in a choice of court
clause.
5. Transient Jurisdiction and Human Rights Exception
Another prohibited basis in the prior drafts is what is often referred to
as "tag" jurisdiction. Tag or transient jurisdiction has a long history in both
the United States and the United Kingdom. 89 Tag jurisdiction permits a
court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant served with process in the
particular jurisdiction. This requires no court/claim nexus and very little
court/defendant nexus other than the presence of the defendant in the forum
jurisdiction).
86 See ZIVILPRESSORDNUNG [ZPO] art. 23.(F.R.G.).
87 C. civ. art. 14 (Fr.). See also Clermont, supra note 8, at 92 ("The forum-shopping
potential ofjurisdiction based on the plaintiffs nationality is evident, even though in practice
this exorbitant jurisdiction may not be abused all that often.").
88 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 196; Murphy, supra note 3, at 420 ("'[C]ivil law
attorneys (and their clients) are profoundly uncomfortable with jurisdiction based on doing
business or minimum contacts,-which they find vague and unpredictable."' (quoting Kovar
Testimony, supra note 3, at 26)); Clermont, supra note 8, at 95-96 ("The Europeans'
principal objection to U.S. jurisdictional law is its proclivity to base general jurisdiction on
rather thin contacts, namely, allowing any and all causes of action to be brought on the basis
of the defendant's physical presence, property ownership, or doing business in the forum.").
Because doing business has a long history in the United States, Jeffrey Kovar felt that doing
business must be at least on the gray list because "the U.S. Bar will be extremely critical of
any convention that would not allow this basic notion of jurisdiction to continue in the gray
area as a matter of national law." Kovar Letter of 9/10/00, supra note 29, at 6.
Some argue that giving up doing business general jurisdiction should not be a problem for
the United States, however, because "Helicopteros reined in the concept of general
jurisdiction by holding it unconstitutional to exercise jurisdiction over a company that not
only negotiated a contract in the forum, the faulty performance of which resulted in the cause
of action, but also purchased most of its equipment and trained its personnel there."
Weintraub, supra note 15, at 1278 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 410-11 (1984)).
89 But cf Clermont, supra note 8, at 112 ("Formerly the most important basis of U.S.
jurisdiction, but today far from essential, [transient jurisdiction] is occasionally used to sue
foreigners in the United States, even though the resulting judgments would be unlikely to
receive recognition or enforcement abroad.").
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when process is served.
The European Union was hostile to tag jurisdiction and sought to
prohibit it from the Convention.9" The United States agreed to eliminate tag
jurisdiction as a basis, but advocated retaining it in special cases of human
rights violations, war crimes, and actions against those who profited from
the Holocaust.91 Article 18(3) of the 2001 Draft evinced a willingness to
compromise, as tag jurisdiction for human rights violations had been moved
to the gray list.92 This effort, while showing encouraging prospects for a
future comprehensive draft, was ultimately rendered unnecessary for
purposes of the final draft, because tag jurisdiction is not necessary if the
defendant has voluntarily agreed to have a certain court exercise jurisdiction
over the dispute.9 3 Eliminating tag jurisdiction from the final treaty
presents problems for the United States, which sometimes obtains
jurisdiction over foreign defendants who are merely passing through the
United States, but have nonetheless hurt U.S. citizens.
6. Forum Non Conveniens and Lis Pendens
When one of the jurisdictional bases on the white list is satisfied, the
next question is whether the court has to assume jurisdiction, or whether it
may decline jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens or lis pendens.
While the E.U. member states wanted to exclude forum non conveniens and
allow a court to decline jurisdiction only when parallel proceedings occur
(is pendens), the United States advocated including a forum non
conveniens provision.
Civil law countries fear the type of discretion given to a court by forum
non conveniens because it allows too much variety in application and
because civil law countries do not trust individual courts the way the United
States does.94 While the United States vests adjudicatory authority in its
90 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 345. The Restatement of Foreign Relations states that
transient jurisdiction "is not generally acceptable under international law." Weintraub, supra
note 15, at 1279 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 421 cmt. e (1987)).
Consequently, the Supreme Court, if confronted with transient jurisdiction in an international
context, may not follow its decision in Burnham v. Superior Court, which permitted transient
jurisdiction between United States citizens because of international concerns. See
Weintraub, supra note 15, at 1279 (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 607-08
(1990)).
91 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 345 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995)). See also Kovar Letter of 9/10/00, supra note 29, at 6 (expressing concern that
American human rights advocates will be unhappy with the 1999 Draft because it does not
"adequately cover[] fundamental human rights claims").
92 See 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 18(3); Silberman, supra note 10, at 345 (discussing
transient jurisdiction and human rights litigation internationally).
93 See generally Convention, supra note I (lacking a provision discussing tag jurisdiction
or human rights violations).
94 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 329-30. An example of diversity in application is
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courts, E.U. member states vest adjudicatory authority in non-judicial
bodies because of the people's fear of judicial discretion. 5 Similarly, civil
law jurisdictions dislike the doctrine of forum non conveniens96 because it
permits a trial court to exercise discretion in applying a multifactor
balancing test.9 7 The Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention do not
mention forum non conveniens and the European Court of Justice continues
to hold thatforum non conveniens cannot be invoked under the Brussels
Regulation.9 Although the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention do
that the United States jurisdictional rules allow forum shopping to some extent because the
plaintiff can choose from a list of jurisdictional bases and sue in the court that is the most
convenient or provides the best possible judgment for them. European and civil law
countries discourage forum shopping by allowing jurisdiction only where the defendant is
domiciled or, under the special jurisdiction rules, several enumerated bases on the list of
acceptable bases of jurisdiction. See id. at 328. For example, under the Brussels Convention
and Regulation created by civil law countries, the special jurisdictional rules mandate that a
contract action may only be brought in the "place of performance of the obligation."
Brussels Convention, supra note 20, art. 5(1); Id. art. 5(l)(b) (contracts for goods and
services). See also Silberman, supra note 10, at 328 (explaining Brussels Convention and
Regulation's deterrence of forum shopping). But see Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum
Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 467, 468 (2002) [hereinafter "Brand III"] (noting that civil law countries do not ask
whether another forum is clearly more appropriate, rather, they apply a strict first-to-file rule,
thus giving the most consideration to the plaintiff's choice of fora).
95 See von Mehren, supra note 33, at 195 (discussing differences between civil and
common law jurisdictions). States that vest more adjudicatory authority in their courts trust
their courts with discretion while states who fear discretion severely limit it by rule making.
See id.
Because forum shopping measures, such as antisuit injunctions, have gotten out of control,
some argue that lis pendens and forum non conveniens provisions in the Convention would
be a better way to handle the situation. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment,
Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of
International Litigation. 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 314, 314 (1997) (explaining that forum shopping
has turned into an art, first focusing on plaintiffs choice, and then focusing on
countermeasures by defendants, such as, motions to stay, dismissal for forum non
conveniens, suits for declaratory judgment of nonliability, antisuit injunctions and temporary
restraining orders).
96 For a detailed history of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, starting in Scotland and
England, see Brand III, supra note 94, at 469-74. For a detailed history discussing the
history of the doctrine offorum non conveniens in the United States, Brand III, supra note
94, at 474-82. For a comparison between common law countries' doctrine of forum non
conveniens and similar doctrines in civil law countries, see Brand III, supra note 94, at 469-
88 (discussing doctrines in England, Scotland, the United States, Canada, Australia,
Germany and Japan).
97 But see Lowenfeld, supra note 95, at 318 ("[B]ecause I have been brought up in a
system where judges are not thought of as officials, and indeed are supposed to be chosen for
their sound discretion, I find the fear of judicial discretion unpersuasive. In any event, I
detect a softening of the traditional European opposition to forum non conveniens,
attributable at least in part to recognition of the problems of parallel litigation.").
98 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 329 (citing Case C-288/92, Custom Made
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not permit forum non conveniens, they do allow the doctrine of lis pendens
for parallel proceedings, but even then judicial discretion is curtailed
because only the court first seised has jurisdiction to hear the case. 99
Because civil law countries fear placing discretion in adjudicatory bodies,
they prefer more rigid rules. In the context of forum non conveniens and lis
pendens, these philosophical tensions created difficulty early in the
Convention in procuring a provision acceptable to both types of legal
systems. 1 00
The 2001 Draft, however, shows the delegates' willingness to
compromise. 0 1  Article 21 of the 2001 Draft contains a lis pendens
provision while Article 22 contains a modified version of forum non
conveniens.0 2 Article 21 of the 2001 Draft follows the Brussels Regulation
in that it requires the court second seised to stay the proceedings in favor of
the court first seised.10 3 This provision, however, is more limited than the
Brussels Regulation because paragraph three permits the court second
seised to continue with the proceedings if the court first seised has taken an
unreasonably long time to make a decision or the plaintiff has not taken
steps to facilitate the process.10 4  Paragraph seven links the lis pendens
Commercial Ltd. v. Stawa Metallbau GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2913).
99 See Brussels Regulation, supra note 22, art. 28. See also Silberman, supra note 10, at
329-30. While the lis pendens provision in Article 28 of the Brussels Regulation deters
parallel proceedings, it encourages a race to the courthouse. See Lowenfeld, supra note 95,
at 319-20. But because the Brussels Regulation jurisdictional rules are exclusive,
inconvenient fora should be less of a concern. See id. (explaining that the exclusivity of the
regulation makes forum shopping less of an issue).
o See Silberman, supra note 10, at 329-30. See Clermont, supra note 8, at 118
("[Europeans] detest explicit discretion.... [Therefore,] [t]he United States [] should be
willing to abandon the doctrine [of forum non conveniens]."). Some argue that the United
States should abandon the doctrine of forum non conveniens because it is not even useful to
American plaintiffs. See id. at 119 (explaining that 180 transnational cases were dismissed
for forum non conveniens between 1947 and 1984 and of those 180 plaintiffs attorneys who
were sent a questionnaire, the 85 who replied all lost in the foreign court with most cases
being abandoned or settled for little). Moreover, forum non conveniens is unnecessary
under the public policy exception because the reasonableness test in the Due Process Clause
will allow the court to decline jurisdiction if it feels that it would be an unreasonable burden
on the defendant to litigate in the forum. See id. at 120-21 ("The Constitution prevails over
treaty obligations.").
101 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 346.
102 001 Draft, supra note 34, arts. 21-22; see Brand III, supra note 94, at 492-94
(discussing 2001 Draft).
103 Compare 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 21, with Brussels Regulation, supra note 22,
arts. 28, 29. See also Brand III, supra note 94, at 492-94 (discussing 2001 Draft).
104 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 21(3); see also Brand III, supra note 94, at 492-93;
Silberman, supra note 10, at 346-47 (discussing the lis pendens doctrine). The Brussels
Convention/Regulation applies the lis pendens doctrine, but because problems with the
application of the rule arose, the Hague Convention modified the doctrine. See Silberman,
supra note 10, at 346-47 (discussing problems with the Brussels Convention/Regulation and
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doctrine to the modified forum non conveniens doctrine in Article 22 by
permitting the court second seised to continue with proceedings if the court
first seised declines to hear the case because another forum is clearly more
appropriate. 1
05
Article 22 of the 2001 Draft contains a limited provision allowing
courts to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. 106 Under Article
22, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been modified and requires
four elements: exclusive jurisdiction of the court, the exceptional
circumstances surrounding the case, clear inappropriateness of the present
forum, and clear appropriateness of another forum.'1 7  Like the U.S.
balancing test, there are four factors that the court must consider in making
a determination: inconvenience to the parties based on their habitual
residence, the location of the evidence including witnesses and the
procedures to attain the evidence, "limitation or prescription periods"
applicable to the instant action, and whether the decision is likely to be
recognized and enforced. 1
08
The Special Commission emphasized that Article 22 is not the same as
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and should apply only if the court
knows that another court will accept jurisdiction.'0 9 The 2001 Draft also
limits the traditional doctrine of forum non conveniens by adopting a more
stringent standard, permitting a court to decline jurisdiction only if "it is
clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of
another State has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the
dispute. 1''° Even with these limitations, the discretion remaining in these
provisions shows the civil law countries' willingness to compromise."'
the lis pendens doctrine).
105 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 22; see also Brand III, supra note 94, at 493.
106 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 22; see also Silberman, supra note 10, at 346
(discussing 2001 Draft and forum non conveniens). See generally Hague Conference on
Private International Law, Note on the Question of "Forum Non Conveniens " in Perspective
of a Double Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Decisions, Hague
Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 3 (Apr. 1996), available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3486&dtid=35 (discussing
forum non conveniens and lispendens doctrines in common law and civil law countries).
107 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 22(1); see also Brand III, supra note 94, at 493.
108 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 22(2); see also Brand III, supra note 94, at 493.
109 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 346 (citing Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 37, at
89).
11o 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. 22(1); Silberman, supra note 10, at 346 n.146.
111 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 347-48 ("The discretion built into the Hague is
particularly appropriate given the wide disparity of potential parties to this worldwide effort
and the absence of any supranational tribunal to preside over its implementation. The Hague
Draft of these provisions reflects the blending of the quite different regimes of its
constituents."); see also Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31, at 9 (discussing the 1999
Draft and mentioning that while the compromise is admirable, it may be harder to achieve
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The final treaty, however, requires an explicit choice of forum clause.
Thus, the progress made is ultimately futile as a court will reject a forum
non conveniens argument when a choice of court clause is present.'12
B. Damages
Because European states fear jury verdicts and excessive or punitive
damages, the United States compromised in Article 33 of the 1999 Draft
and the 2001 Draft, allowing an enforcing court to recognize and enforce an
award of damages only to "the extent that similar or comparable damages
could have been awarded in the State addressed."'1 13 The U.S. concession in
Article 33 is surprising, considering that the U.S. refusal to include a similar
provision in the attempted recognition and enforcement treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom in the 1970s halted the process and
ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the treaty-making process. 14
The Convention also includes a limitation on damages in Article 11,
allowing a court to refuse to recognize and enforce non-compensatory
damages. This provision seems unnecessary though, because a party could
easily avoid a country's excessive damage award by simply agreeing to a
different jurisdiction with more favorable laws in the choice of court
agreement. 15  Including such a superfluous provision in the final
convention shows how much foreign countries fear U.S. damage awards.
On the other hand, it allows parties to choose to litigate in U.S. courts
without the fear of an excessive damage award. Thus, litigants can take
advantage of other benefits of the U.S. system without reservation.
C. Subject Matter
The negotiation of the Convention forced the member states to decide
whether to include, or expressly exclude, certain causes of action.
1. Antitrust
The Member States compromised by eliminating antitrust or
competition law cases from the 2001 Draft. 1 6 Foreign countries dislike
U.S. antitrust law because of the broad U.S. discovery rules, treble damage
acceptance in the United States).
112 See Brand III, supra note 94, at 494 (citing 2001 Draft, supra note 34, arts. 4, 22 and
explaining that "a choice of court clause would both create jurisdiction and prevent a forum
non conveniens claim from allowing divergence from the chosen forum").
113 1999 Draft, supra note 34, art. 33(1). See also von Mehren, supra note 33, at 195 n.9.
114 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 327 (discussing the failed U.S.-U.K. treaty).
115 Convention, supra note 1, art. 11.
116 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 335 (discussing antitrust compromises).
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awards,1 17 and bases for jurisdiction including the so-called "effects" test." 8
Because of harsh damage awards, other countries enacted blocking statutes
to prevent enforcement of American antitrust judgments, including
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 9  Some of these
jurisdictions wanted the Hague Convention to cover antitrust simply so that
they could further limit the U.S. application of its antitrust laws. 120 In a
prior draft, antitrust cases generally fell within the gray area and foreign
courts were not obligated to enforce them.1 21 The United States, however,
wanted to completely remove antitrust cases from the scope of the
Convention,122 so that it could still use prohibited bases, such as general
business dealings, to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant in antitrust matters
(although the judgment would not necessarily be enforceable abroad).
23
The United States succeeded in excluding antitrust matters from the final
Convention.
2. Intellectual Property
Two areas of law that are still being developed by each Member State
117 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 251 (2001)
("Moreover, not sharing the contingent fee system supported by our multiple damages
provisions, they view such awards as nothing more than rank exorbitance.").
118 See Buxbaum, supra note 117, at 250. However, the United States has made some
progress by entering into agreements with Germany, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Israel, Japan,
Australia, and European Communities.
119 Id. at 251; William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention,
32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 363 (2001) (discussing blocking statutes). See also Foreign
Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, c. 3, § 9 (Austl.); Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act 1984, R.S.C., c. 49 § 9, amended by 1996 S.C. 8(1), c. 28 (Can.); Protection of
Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11, § 6(2) (Eng.) (allowing defendants to recoup the multiple
damages awarded against them under the Clayton Act).
120 See Dodge, supra note 119, at 364. See also 1999 Draft, supra note 28, art. 10
(implicitly including antitrust litigation in the scope of the Draft). Jeffrey Kovar, in his letter
to the Hague, explained that excluding antitrust from the white list will deter acceptance and
ratification of the convention. Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31, at 7-8. Accordingly,
the United States wanted to entirely exclude antitrust law from the convention. Kovar Letter
of 9/10/00, supra note 29, at 4; see also Dodge, supra note 119, at 364 n.8 (citing Interview
with Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law, in S.F., Cal.
(Sept. 12, 2000)) (noting that the United States sought exclusion of antitrust).
121 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 335 n.91 (discussing 1999 Draft).
122 See id. (discussing the U.S. position).
123 See id. (citing 2001 Draft, supra note 34, art. (1)(2)(i)) (explaining benefits and
disadvantages of gray list); but see Dodge, supra note 119, at 377 (arguing that excluding
general jurisdiction based on doing business will not affect the U.S. ability to apply its
antitrust laws extraterritorially because Article 18(2) of the 1999 Draft states that a
jurisdiction may not obtain jurisdiction based "solely" on a prohibited method; therefore, the
United States could use a combination of bases).
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are intellectual property and e-commerce. Because of this lack of
established law, creating uniform rules to apply globally was difficult to
achieve.124  A major difficulty with international intellectual property
litigation is the problem of multiple proceedings. For example, there may
be multiple companies who own the same trademark and have similar
products but in different legal systems. 25 These companies may sue for
trademark infringement in different places, resulting in inconsistent
judgments because of varying substantive law. 126 Moreover, treaties like
the Berne Convention,127 the Paris Convention,128 and the TRIPS
Agreement 129 fail to address the problem of multiple proceedings. 3 ° The
intellectual property community hoped that the Hague Conference would
help resolve this problem by providing uniform rules, such as claim and
issue preclusion, and perhaps eventually consolidation of proceedings. 3 1
Another problem with intellectual property litigation is that it is
territorial. 32  In infringement cases, the injury occurs where the
infringement occurs. 13 3 This means that if a foreign company engages in
trademark infringement of a U.S. trademark in Japan, the injury occurred in
Japan and Japanese trademark rules would govern, not the U.S. rules.
13 4
Moreover, if the injury occurred in both the United States and Japan, U.S.
124 See Notice of Hearing and Request for Comments on Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,575,
43,576 (Aug. 20, 2001) ("One of the primary flaws asserted about the October 1999 draft
was that international developments such as the advent of the Internet and e-commerce have
called into question some of the jurisdictional rules that serve as the basis for the proposed
Convention.").
125 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next
Century: Article an Alert to the Intellectual Property Bar: The Hague Judgments
Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421, 422 (2001) (discussing intellectual property
concerns).
126 See id. at 423.
127 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised, July 24, 1971 (amended 1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
128 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised, July 14, 1967 (amended 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583.
129 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15, 1993,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
130 See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 423 ("These agreements impose minimum standards,
not uniform law and, therefore, do not prevent conflicting outcomes."). For a discussion on
the problems with multiple proceedings in the Internet context, see N. Jansen Calamita, ed.,
International Litigation, 38 INT'L LAW. 303, 314 (2004) ("Global forum shopping with
parallel proceedings has become a global problem requiring more than unilateral actions to
resolve.").
131 See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 424-25.
.32 See id. at 432.
133 See id.
134 See id. (noting that there are some limited exceptions to this rule).
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courts would likely dismiss the Japanese cause of action on the basis of
forum non conveniens because of the difficulty in applying Japanese law
and other considerations.' 35 This dismissal forces the trademark holder to
pursue separate proceedings to obtain complete relief. 1
36
The delegates encountered problems developing provisions that would
resolve issues of multiple proceedings and incomplete relief, as the national
laws of Member States were not clearly defined. Because of these issues,
intellectual property was excluded from the Convention, with the exception
of copyright issues. Exclusion of intellectual property issues, while leaving
a hole in international judgment enforcement, allows Members States to
develop their own internal laws. If and when the delegates meet again to
create a comprehensive international enforcement of judgments treaty, the
delegates will be able to speak from a more educated and experienced view,
which may help to yield a workable and comprehensive agreement.
3. E-commerce
E-commerce has become a huge industry over the last several years.
137
The e-commerce community had problems with the Hague Conference
because national laws for e-commerce are not fully developed, making it
difficult to achieve consensus. 38  The e-commerce community also had
problems with the Hague Conference's authorization of enforcement of
click wrap agreements which some organizations feel "have an adverse
impact on current electronic commerce." 39
Yet another problem was the coverage of business-to-consumer
("B2C") contracts in the 1999 Draft and the 2001 Draft. Under the Brussels
Regulation or the proposed Hague Drafts for tort jurisdiction in B2C
contracts, a company doing business over the Internet may be subject to
suits all over the world, because it is hard to tell where the defendant acted
"' See id. at 433.
136 See id.
137 See generally Benjamin C. Elacqua, The Hague Runs into B2B: Why Restructuring
the Hague Convention of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters to Deal with
B2B Contracts is Long Overdue, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 93, 94 (2004) (discussing Internet
statistics). E-commerce, as defined by Congress, is "any transaction conducted over the
Internet or through Internet access, comprising the sale, lease, offer, or delivery of property,
goods, services, or information, whether or not for consideration, and includes the provision
of Internet access." Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); see also Elacqua,
supra, at 94 (quoting same).
138 See generally Kovar Letter of 2/22/00, supra note 31 (discussing problems with e-
commerce and the 1999 Draft).
139 See Elacqua, supra note 137, at 95 (citing Letter from Affect: Americans for Fair
Electronic Commerce Transactions to Jeffrey Kovar on Feb. 5, 2003, available at
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/affecthague.pdf). See id. at 95 n. 13 (explaining that
click wrap agreements are the "I Agree" buttons that consumers push when conducting
transactions online).
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when basing contacts on Internet activity. 140 Because a company can reach
nearly anywhere in the world through the Internet, it is also difficult to tell
where the injury occurred and thus where jurisdiction is proper. This
problem of multiple places of injury encourages forum shopping, creating a
burden on smaller companies who reach foreign countries solely through
their Internet sites but cannot afford to defend suits internationally.,4  If a
comprehensive Hague Conference convention did cover e-commerce and
companies were subject to suits anywhere their Internet sites could be
accessed, e-commerce companies would have to avoid certain jurisdictions
with unfavorable laws such as France, who recently imposed a fine on
Yahoo! for selling Nazi paraphernalia on its website, 142 an activity protected
under the First Amendment in the United States but illegal under French
law. 143
The Convention has not helped the e-commerce industry because
choice of court clauses impede the spread of global technology and because
parties fear being haled before a court in a foreign jurisdiction. 44 Small
140 See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 454 ("Communication sometimes depends on only
the unilateral activity of viewers-accessing an Internet site, for example, involves no
meaningful activities on the part of the its proprietors."); see also Elacqua, supra note 137, at
110 (advocating that the Hague adopt a targeting approach to personal jurisdiction in the
context of Internet use so as to eliminate the need to alter the choice of court provision).
[E]-business groups generally favor a 'country of origin' approach, under which
companies would be subject only to the laws and courts of their home country.
They argue that this approach is needed to encourage the growth of electronic
commerce, as the 'country of destination approach' would be too costly for
businesses. Of course in this case, the argument of consumer groups is that large
companies could pick the most favorable jurisdiction and force consumers to
litigate in inconvenient forums.
Online Consumers and the Consequences of Jurisdiction Policies, Internet Business Law
Services, May 1, 2005, at 1. The United States delegation expressed concern over e-
commerce in the area of consumer contracts in Article 7 of the 1999 Draft. See Kovar Letter
2/22/00, supra note 31, at 6-7 ("These formulations have raised a storm of controversy in
the electronic commerce world.").
141 See Elacqua, supra note 137, at 98-99 ("Businesses would be able to find
jurisdictions with favorable laws, enforceable in all member countries.").
142 UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, Tribunal de Grande Instance [T.G.I.]
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, D. 2000, inf. rap. 172. For a
summary of the Yahoo! case and related links, see Richard Salis, A Look at how U.S. Based
Yahoo! was Condemned by French Law, Juriscom.net, Jan. 11, 2001,
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
143 See Elacqua, supra note 137, at 99-100 ("The draft treaty is not meant for a global
economy that supports e-commerce, and some argue that the treaty is an attempt by the
Europeans to put their mark on an area of law they have no control over.").
'44 See id. at 111- 12 ("Choice of court clauses are a potential hindrance to the spread of
global technology and business, evidenced by a recent survey, indicating that, many
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companies in particular attempt to avoid entering into contracts because
they lack bargaining power and do not want to subject themselves to
contractual choice of court clauses. E-commerce law has not been fully
developed in each country. Consequently, the Member States were
ultimately unable to agree on specialized rules for dealing with e-commerce
issues. 1
45
IV. THE CONVENTION'S TERMS
The final Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is only a slice of
the original draft. The much narrower Convention is limited to
"international" and "civil or commercial" cases. 146  A case is deemed
"international" unless the parties involved are both from the same
Contracting State and all issues relating to the dispute involve only the
Contracting State. 47 Other than a natural person, a "person" or entity is a
resident where it has its statutory seat, its central administration, its
principle place of business, or was otherwise formed under the laws of that
jurisdiction. 48 In applying the recognition and enforcement rules, a case is
"international" where recognition and enforcement is sought.1
49
All of the debate about the white list, the black list, a mixed or double
convention, judicial discretion, etc., was ultimately unnecessary for
purposes of the Convention. In order for the Convention to have force, the
choice of court agreement must be between at least two parties, be in
writing or another acceptable means of communication, and designate a
certain State exclusively for resolution of disputes arising under the
agreement. 50 The "judgment" must be a decision on the merits, rather than
an injunction or other "interim measures for protection."' 51 Approved
companies forgo entering into contracts because they could be subject to jurisdiction in a
number of courts.").
145 See Kovar Letter of 9/10/00, supra note 29, at 5 ("The overriding concern of the U.S.
delegation is that delegations not cripple the convention by trying to do what is unattainable.
In areas like intellectual property, the risk is very high that we will not be able to reach an
adequate compromise on jurisdiction that will satisfy the very different litigation,
technology, and business interests at stake.").
146 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
141 See id.
148 See id. art. 4(2).
149 See id. art. 1(3).
1 0 See id. art. 3. Choice of court agreements are exclusive "unless the parties expressly
provided otherwise .. " See id. at art. 3(b). The United States will have to be careful
because United States common law courts tend to hold that a choice of court clause is
nonexclusive unless expressly indicated otherwise, while foreign countries tend to hold that
a choice of court clause is exclusive unless expressly indicated otherwise. See Peter D.
Trooboff, Choice-of-Court Clauses, NAT'L L. J., Vol. 26, No. 20, at 14 (Jan. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter Choice-of-Court].
151 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1); see also supra note 1, art. 7 (excluding issues
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judicial settlements by a chosen court will also be recognized and enforced
if the state of origin would recognize and enforce them in the same manner
it would a judgment.1
52
A. Exclusions
The Convention is primarily commercial; it specifically excludes
agreements involving consumers. 1 3 Accordingly, personal injury actions,
which motivated so much concern over the U.S. jury system, are not
covered by the Convention. Also excluded as a similarly "individual" issue
are cases involving employment agreements. 154
The Convention also excludes other specific subjects including: issues
as to the status and legal capacity of natural persons; maintenance
obligations; family law issues; wills and succession; insolvency and related
matters; common carriers ("carriage of passengers and goods"); "marine
pollution, limitations on liability for maritime claims, general average, and
emergency towage and salvage"; antitrust;'5 5 nuclear damage; personal
injury; 156 tort for damage to property not arising out of a contractual
relationship; real property and tenancies; "validity, nullity, or dissolution of
legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs;" validity of
intellectual property1 57  other than copyright; intellectual property
infringement except copyright, unless the infringement is brought for a
breach of contract; public registers; and arbitrations. 1
58
B. Jurisdiction
Article 5 provides the Convention's jurisdictional base. The court that
relating to interim measures for relief).
152 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
' See id. at art. 2(1)(a). See also Brand I, note 27 at 200 (discussing provision of the
1999 and 2001 Drafts, including consumers and employment contracts).
154 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a).
155 See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text (discussing antitrust issues in the
Hague Conference). Some foreign jurisdictions call antitrust "competition law."
156 But see supra notes 70-77 (discussing scope of 1999 and 2001 Drafts including
personal injury in the text).
157 Intellectual property rights concerned many states because intellectual property rights
are usually determined exclusively by the state that issued the patent, copyright, etc. See
Brand ASIL, supra note 1, at 2. Many international agreements, however, deal with the
transfer of property rights. See id. at 1. Accordingly, excluding intellectual property entirely
would have thwarted the purpose of the Convention for many. See id. at 2. The delegates,
consequently, agreed to exclude infringement and intellectual property rights validity from
the convention but allowed them to be included when the issue is only a preliminary matter.
See id. at 2. See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text (discussing intellectual property
concerns and the Hague Convention).
158 See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 2(2), 2(4).
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the parties designate has jurisdiction over the dispute and may not decline
jurisdiction because it believes that another state should decide the case,
unless the exclusive choice of court agreement is null and void under that
state's law. 159 The jurisdictional rules do not affect the subject matter, the
value of the claim, or the state's internal rules for jurisdiction.
Claims brought before forums other than that chosen by the parties
must be dismissed. 60 The dismissal requirement does not apply where the
contractual choice of court clause agreement is null and void under the
chosen court's state law; under the law of the seised court, a party lacked
legal capacity to enter into the agreement; enforcing the agreement would
be manifestly unjust or manifestly contrary to the public policy of the seised
court's state law; the agreement cannot reasonably be performed due to
reasons beyond the parties' control; or, the chosen court has declined to
hear the case.'
61
A chosen court may also refuse jurisdiction if it determines that the
state has no connection with the defendant or the claim other than the
choice of court agreement. 62 In other words, "random" choice of forum
clauses, are discouraged-a French seller and Spanish buyer should not
choose Berlin as the forum.
C. Enforcement
Article 8 is the heart of the Convention. It mandates that if a judgment
is issued pursuant to the Convention's rules and can be recognized and
enforced in the chosen court, then other Member States must recognize and
enforce the judgment unless the judgment falls within one of the
permissible bases to refuse recognition and enforcement.
63
9 See id. at art. 5(1)H2).
160 See id. at art. 6.
161 See id. at art. 6. Some commentators fear that the Convention did not go far enough
and allows too many exclusions. See infra note 189, and accompanying text.
162 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 19. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the court/claim, court/defendant nexus dilemma during Hague Convention
negotiations).
163 See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8(1), 8(3). The conference also included a form
for a court granting the judgment to fill out. See Hague Conference on Private International
Law: Convention on June 30, 2005 Choice of Court Agreements, Annex to the Convention,
Recommended Form, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/form37e.pdf. See also
Foreign Judgments 10/17/05, supra note 26, at 13. Some argue that a downfall to mandatory
enforcement will be that the United States, however, also would be required to enforce
"distasteful foreign judgments." See Clermont, supra note 8 at 111. While United States
courts are comfortable enforcing sister state judgments because the Due Process Clause
applies, ensuring fairness to the defendant, foreign courts' procedural fairness requirements
remain less certain. See id. ("Accordingly, the treaty must have ... a provision giving each
signatory country broad control over which countries can sign on vis-A-vis that country, as
well as narrowly drawn public policy exceptions for procedural due process violations and
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The key to this provision, and for that matter any enforcement regime,
is the insulation of the judgment's merits from review. Other than
reviewing the chosen court's decision to determine whether the
Convention's rules were followed, an enforcing court may not review the
merits of the case and is bound by the findings of fact of the rendering court
unless the judgment was by default.164 The enforcing court may refuse or
postpone recognition and enforcement if the chosen court is reviewing the
case or the time limit to seek review in the state of origin has not expired. 1
65
As with the Brussels Regulation, Lugano Convention and the New
York Convention, the enforcement obligation comes with specific
exceptions:
1. the agreement is null and void under the chosen court's state law;
2. a party lacked legal capacity to enter into the agreement under the
enforcing state's law;
3. the documents instituting the proceedings did not provide the
defendant adequate time to defend (unless the defendant did not
contest and his or her state permits contestation);
4. there was fraud in the procedure procuring the judgment;
5. it would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the
enforcing court's state law to recognize and enforce the judgment;
6. the judgment from the chosen court is inconsistent with another
judgment by the enforcing state between the same parties; or
7. an earlier judgment of a contracting state, which is enforceable
under the convention, is inconsistent with the current judgment
between the same parties on the same cause of action.
166
Many of these bases for enforcement jurisdiction were excluded so
that parties to contracts could not thwart government interests in Member
other repugnancies.") (citation omitted).
164 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(2); see also Choice-of-Court, supra note 150, at
14 (noting that "[t]he key to the effectiveness of the proposed convention is the prohibition
of any review of the merits of the judgment by the courts of another party to the
convention.").
165 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(4).
... See id. art. 9.
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States,167 while others have their root in fundamental due process
concerns. 168
D. Damages
The Convention's special treatment of damages reflects concerns with
U.S. jury verdicts and excessive and punitive damages.1 69 Under Article 11,
an enforcing court may refuse recognition and enforcement of a judgment
for exemplary or punitive damages "that do not compensate a party for
actual loss or harm suffered."' 170  The article essentially adopts standard
practices of foreign countries who refuse to recognize and enforce damage
awards that they believe are excessive under their public policy.
1 71
Under Article 15, however, if a party so requests, recognition and
enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be granted.1 72 Thus, for
example, in a breach of contract action for compensatory damages of $5
million and punitive damages of $50 million, the compensatory portion
would be enforced.
E. Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Clauses
A choice of forum provision need not be exclusive to qualify for
enforcement. Article 22 permits a Member State to declare that it will
recognize and enforce judgments for non-exclusive choice of court
agreements that meet the criteria for the Convention. 73 In doing so, the
declaring Member State must recognize and enforce a judgment from
another Member State if (1) the chosen court was designated in a non-
exclusive choice of court agreement, (2) the chosen court was the first
seised, and (3) a judgment does not already exist and is not pending in a
another court that would be permitted to hear such a case under the non-
exclusive choice of court agreement on the same cause of action. 1
74
167 See Brand ASIL, supra note 1, at 2 (noting reasons for exclusions).
168 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing due process concerns).
169 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 11. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying
text (discussing foreign countries' concerns with American damage awards). Some question
whether this provision is really necessary when the parties have agreed to a certain
jurisdiction fully knowing the state's law on damages. Cf Choice-of-Court, supra note 150.
170 Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(1). "The Convention also makes clear that the
awarded amount of compensatory damages in a judgment is not reviewable." Foreign
Judgments 10/17/05, supra note 26, at 13. Moreover, "[t]he final report on the convention
will include a negotiated and agreed-upon narrow interpretation on th[e] critical point" of
limiting or excluding excessive damages. Foreign Judgments 10/17/05, supra note 26, at 13.
171 See Brand ASIL, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining damages under Convention).
172 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 15.
173 See id. art. 22(1).
174 See id. art. 22(2).
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"This provision is potentially the most significant benefit for
harmonization, as the likely effect of any Member States making this
declaration will be to restrict the effect of the forum non conveniens
doctrine for defendants challenging jurisdiction in the context of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. ' 7 5 This provision is
predicted to expand the scope of the Convention and provide greater
uniformity in the recognition and enforcement of judgments internationally,
if adopted by the Member States. 
176
F. The Convention's Relationship to Present and Future Treaties
The Convention provides that it should be interpreted in a way that is
compatible with other treaties in existence between Member States. 7 7 If,
however, applying the Convention would be inconsistent with an existing
treaty with a non-member State, then the Convention will not apply to
matters involving the non-member state.1 78 Where two member states are
already mutually party to an existing treaty on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments (such as a regional convention like Lugano), the
Convention will not disturb the other treaty so long as recognition and
enforcement will not be less than under the Convention.
1 79
Moreover, if the parties to the Convention create a new treaty or
treaties concerning a specific matter, the Convention will not be disturbed
nor will it disturb the provisions of the new treaty unless the new treaty
provides otherwise. 80 This provision allows the Member States to continue
negotiations and work towards a more comprehensive treaty or at least
piecemeal treaties on specific issues.
81
175 Antonin I. Pribectic, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, THE
GLOBETROTTER, Vol. 10, No. 1, Sept. 2005, at 3.
176 See Brand ASIL, supra note 1, at 1 (The value in the non-exclusive choice of court
provision is that "it recognizes that, once the parties have agreed that a tribunal is acceptable,
there is value in the free movement of its judgment.").
177 For a discussion on how the Convention will work in conjunction with other treaties,
see Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Future Convention on Exclusive
Choice of Court Agreements and Arbitration, Prelim. Doc. 32 (June 2005), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/j dgm-pd32e.pdf.
178 See Convention, supra note 1, art. 26(3).
179 See id. art. 26(4).
"So See id. art. 26(5).
181 See supra Part III (discussing the 1999 and 2001 Drafts which were much more
comprehensive but had to be, at least temporarily, abandoned as the member states could not
agree on certain provisions).
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V. ASSESSMENT
Currently, no Member State has signed the Convention. 82 Countries
are awaiting a draft report before deliberating on ratification. 183  Some
argue that it will be left to the private sector to persuade Member States to
ratify the treaty. 184  Others have voiced that, because the United States
proposed the Convention, other Member States will wait to see if the United
States ratifies the treaty before taking any action.
185
The ratification debate may hinge in part on whether the Convention is
considered to be a "success." There are different camps. On the positive
side, some have argued that the mere fact that the issue of an international
treaty on the recognition and enforcement of judgments was even
considered is major progress for the Member States, especially the United
States. 186 There is of course the undeniable practical benefit of enforcement
of judgments resulting from choice of forum/court clauses in commercial
contracts. Beyond this, some predict that the Convention will result in
unifying jurisdictional rules internationally' 87  and clarification of
jurisdiction within the United States in an international context.
88
On the negative side, the limitations of the Convention have caused
some-including those close to its creation-to question its likely
effectiveness. Catherine Kessedjian, the former Deputy Secretary General
182 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention of 30 June 2005 on
Choice of Court Agreements, Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conven
tions.status&cid=98 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
183 See CP Tech's Page on the Hague Conference on Private International Law's
Proposed Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, http://www.cptech.org/econ/jurisdiction/hague.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2005). In
fact, Congress is not expected to entertain ratification of the treaty until 2007. See Andrew
C. Schneider, New Treaty Will Help Firms Operate Abroad, KIPLINGER BUSINESS
FORECASTS, Oct. 14, 2005, at 1.
184 See Litigation Convention Needs Private Backing, IBA DAILY NEWS, Sept. 28, 2005,
at 13 [hereinafter Litigation convention] ("It will be up to the private sector to convince
governments that ratification would not only be in the interest of the legal profession, but
also of private enterprises doing business in the global market . .
185 See Foreign Judgments 10/17/05, supra note 26, at 13.
186 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 349 ("[O]ne should not lose sight of the important
lessons that have been learned from the experience and the insights gained in attempting to
understand the wide gap that separates common law and civil law approaches to these issues.
Even a limited convention with quite limited parameters is a first step and is one worth
striving for.") (internal citation omitted).
'87 See Clermont, supra note 8, at 89 ("Rethinking jurisdiction through the process of
treatymaking would permit the United States to improve its own interstate law."). In fact,
the ALl just completed a proposed federal statute which was to accompany the treaty but
will still be important even if the treaty is ratified with its much more limited scope. See
ALl Proposed Statute, supra note 26. The NCCUSL also approved the Uniform Foreign-
Country Judgments Recognition Act (2005). NCCUSL Act, supra note 26.
188 See Silberman, supra note 10, at 333-34.
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of the Hague Conference, expressed concern over the Convention: "I am
not convinced [the Convention] will work.. . . The scope is limited and it
may be a case of death by a thousand exemptions. The five grounds [of
Article 5] for challenge will trigger a flood of litigation."',89 There is the
further potential downside that if the United States does not ratify the
current Convention, other countries would, in turn, enforce U.S. judgments
even less frequently than they do currently.' 90
The Convention should not be labeled as a failure merely because the
reach of the United States exceeded its grasp. The classes of litigants
excluded by the Convention is a point that may figure heavily in Senate
consideration of the Convention. However, the limitations of the
Convention should motivate future amendments. It should not be a basis
for avoiding either ratification or use of the Convention. Generally
accepted principles of international law develop slowly, with trust and with
practice. The Convention is a first step toward that development. It
provides predictability, fills a major current gap, and could generate the
confidence necessary for further expansion of an enforcement regime. That
the light might not bum as brightly as first intended should not result in a
return to the total darkness of a pre-Convention regime.
189 Litigation convention, supra note 184, at 13 (quoting Catherine Kessedjian, the former
deputy secretary general of the Hague Conference). But see Foreign Judgments 10/17/05,
supra, note 26, at 13 ("The negotiators strongly supported, and the report on the convention
will emphasize, the limited scope that they intended for the public policy exception to
enjoy.").
19Q See Miller, supra note 25, at 261 ("Failure to ratify the final version would establish
the United States as an opponent to the Convention, which could in turn result in retributive
decrease in recognition of U.S. judgments.") (internal citation omitted).
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